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Abstract

The September 15, 2008, bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers resulted in a collapse of wholesale
funding markets that threatened the ability of UK financial institutions to continue funding
themselves. By the end of the month, two leading UK banks—HBOS and Bradford &
Bingley—had to be rescued, and there was a real risk that the entire financial system could
collapse. Faced with the need to stabilize the system, UK regulators on October 8 introduced
a package of measures that included a £250 billion Credit Guarantee Scheme (the Guarantee
Scheme) aimed at providing banks with access to needed funding. Under the Guarantee
Scheme, eligible institutions could pay a risk-based fee and issue debt with terms of up to
three years that would be guaranteed by HM Treasury. Debt issuance under the Guarantee
Scheme was initially quite significant at approximately £100 billion by the end of 2008. After
its issuance window closed on February 28, 2010, the Guarantee Scheme terminated on
October 26, 2012, when the final guaranteed debt matured. During the course of its
existence,
the
Guarantee
Scheme
had
guaranteed
approximately
£134 billion in debt. HM Treasury suffered no losses under the program and earned
approximately £4.3 billion in fees.
Keywords: United Kingdom, short-term debt, medium-term debt, government guarantee

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee programs.
1

Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-offinancial-crises/.
2 Christian M. McNamara – Director, New Bagehot Project and Senior Editor, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
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UK Credit Guarantee Scheme
At a Glance
Faced with the need to stabilize the financial
system following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, UK regulators on October 8, 2008,
introduced a package of measures that
included the Credit Guarantee Scheme (the
Guarantee Scheme), the Bank Recapitalisation
Fund, and an expansion of the existing Special
Liquidity Scheme.
Under the Guarantee Scheme, participants
could pay a risk-based fee and issue debt with
terms of up to three years that would be
guaranteed by HM Treasury. Senior unsecured
debt instruments with standard market terms
used to refinance liabilities maturing after the
launch of the Guarantee Scheme were eligible.
Eight major UK financial institutions were
automatically eligible for the Guarantee
Scheme based on their participation in the
Bank Recapitalisation Fund, and other UK
deposit-takers and building societies could
apply.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: “To assist in refinancing maturing,
wholesale funding obligations as they fall due”
Announcement
Date

October 8, 2008

Operational Date

October 13, 2008

Date of First
Guaranteed Loan
Issuance

October 27, 2008

Issuance Window
Expiration Date

Originally April 9, 2009;
extended until December 31,
2009, and then February 28,
2010 (with some ability to roll
over guaranteed debt after this
date)

Program Size

£250 billion

Usage

Approximately £134 billion in
guaranteed debt issued by
approximately 14 institutions

Outcomes

No defaults; £4.3 billion in fees

HM Treasury initially anticipated that £250
collected
billion in debt would be issued under the
Buybacks of guaranteed debt
Guarantee Scheme, and it established this Notable Features
initially prohibited and later
amount as the size of the program subject to
subject to a fee
subsequent adjustment. By the end of 2008,
approximately £100 billion of debt had been issued pursuant to the program by 14 institutions. In
March 2010, shortly after the issuance window for the Guarantee Scheme closed, outstanding
issuances stood at £125 billion, down from a total of £134 billion outstanding. Over the life of the
program, HM Treasury collected fees totaling £4.3 billion and wasn’t required to make any guarantee
payouts.
Summary Evaluation
Although the specific impact of the Guarantee Scheme is difficult to determine given that it was one
component of a package of measures, the establishment of the Guarantee Scheme was followed by a
significant reduction in the stress that had been roiling wholesale funding markets.
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UK Credit Guarantee Scheme: United Kingdom Context
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

$3,102.8 billion in 2007
$2,948.0 billion in 2008

Source: Bloomberg
$50,567 in 2007

GDP per capita

$47,287 in 2008

(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

Source: Bloomberg
As of Q4 2007:

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Sovereign credit
rating (5-year senior
debt)

As of Q4 2008:

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA

Source: Bloomberg
$4,895.3 billion in total assets in 2007
Size of banking
system

$5,299.6 billion in total assets in 2008

Source: Bloomberg
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157.8% in 2007
Size of banking
system as a
percentage of GDP

179.8% in 2008

Source: Bloomberg
Size of banking
system as a
percentage of
financial system

Data not available for 2007/2008

Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
76.8% of total banking assets in 2007

5-bank concentration
of banking system

79.1% of total banking assets in 2008

Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
14% of total banking assets in 2007
Foreign involvement
in banking system

19% of total banking assets in 2008

Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
Data not available for 2007
Government
ownership of banking
system

1% of banks owned by the state in 2008

Source: Call et al. “Bank Ownership – Trends
and Implications”
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100% insurance on deposits up to $4,000;
90% on next $66,000 in 2007
Existence of deposit
insurance

100% insurance on deposits up to $93,000
after October 2008

Source: World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset,
OECD
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I. Overview
Background
In the years leading up to the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, the UK banking system
became increasingly reliant on short-term wholesale funding as growth in customer loans
far outpaced that in customer deposits. As shown in Figure 1, the extent of this customer
funding gap increased from under £600 billion in 2005 to about £900 billion just three years
later. The result was that many UK banks became extremely vulnerable to disruptions in
wholesale funding.
Although stress in the UK banking system was evident as early as the September 2007 run
on Northern Rock (in which the loss of wholesale funding required Northern Rock to seek
assistance from the Bank of England, triggering the first British bank run in almost 150
years), it was not until a year later that the magnitude of the problem became fully apparent.
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008, resulted in a substantial spike
in three-month interbank rates as indicated in Figure 2. Within a short time, the resulting
deterioration of wholesale funding markets had threatened the continued existence of
several of the UK’s leading financial institutions. On September 17, Lloyds TSB agreed to
acquire HBOS for £12 billion in a bid to rescue the country’s largest mortgage lender. On
September 29, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the retail deposit business
and branch network of Bradford & Bingley, the ninth-largest UK bank by market
capitalization, had been transferred to Abbey National and its remaining business taken into
public ownership following a determination by the Financial Services Authority that the
bank no longer met minimum threshold conditions for operating as a depositor. These steps
did little to calm the panic, however, and on October 6,, the FTSE 100 fell by nearly 9% as it
became apparent that the financial system faced the real risk of collapse.
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Figure 1: UK Banks’ Customer Funding Gap

Source: Bank of England 2011, p. 17
Figure 2: Three-Month Interbank Rates

Source: Bank of England 2008, p. 5
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Program Description
To avert this collapse, the British government announced a package of measures on October
8, 2008, designed to restore funding to banks. In addition to the Credit Guarantee Scheme
(the Guarantee Scheme), this package included a £50 billion Bank Recapitalisation Fund
(pursuant to which the government could inject capital into eligible institutions in return for
equity) and an expansion of the existing Special Liquidity Scheme (pursuant to which banks
could exchange high-quality mortgage-backed and other securities for HM Treasury bills for
up to three years) to £200 billion, up from an initially projected £50 billion.
Under the Guarantee Scheme, eligible institutions could have eligible debt with terms of up
to three years guaranteed by HM Treasury in exchange for a fee. The government does not
appear to have established minimum maturity requirements for eligible debt. Initially, HM
Treasury designated eight financial institutions, consisting of the major UK banks and largest
building societies,3 as eligible to participate in the Guarantee Scheme based on their
commitment to strengthen their Tier 1 capital position via participation in the Bank
Recapitalisation Fund. Other financial institutions could make a written request to HM
Treasury for an “Institution Certificate” granting them eligibility. Subject to HM Treasury’s
discretion, to receive an Institution Certificate an institution had to be an authorized UK
deposit taker (including the UK subsidiary of a foreign bank) or a UK building society. The
institution further had to meet a Tier 1 capital threshold specified by HM Treasury and would
have its role in the UK banking system and overall economy evaluated. Finally, the institution
had to agree to submit a plan for being able to access the wholesale funding markets without
benefit of the Guarantee Scheme.
Eligible institutions (whether those initially designated as such or those requesting and
receiving an Institution Certificate) had the ability to apply for an “Eligibility Certificate” with
respect to a given proposed issuance of debt. The application would set forth details about
the proposed issuance including the type of debt, the principal amount, the currency in which
denominated, an indicative interest rate or discount and the proposed issuance and maturity
dates. To be eligible for the Guarantee Scheme, the debt would have to meet “Instrument
Eligibility Criteria” including:
•

being a senior unsecured debt instrument with standard market terms in the form
of a certificate of deposit, commercial paper, a bond or a note;

•

being single currency denominated in an eligible currency (originally sterling,
euros, or US dollars, but later expanded to include Australian dollars, Canadian
dollars, Swiss Francs, and Japanese yen);

3 Abbey National, Barclays, HBOS, HSBC Bank, Lloyds TSB, Nationwide Building Society, Royal Bank of Scotland,

and Standard Chartered.
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•

not containing an event of default constituted by cross-default or crossacceleration (i.e., a default or acceleration under other outstanding debt could not
automatically give rise to a default under this debt); and

•

being used to refinance liabilities maturing after the commencement of the
Guarantee Scheme.

As part of its application, the eligible institution also had to include an executed “CounterIndemnity” (pursuant to which the institution agreed to be responsible for any losses
suffered by HM Treasury in connection with guaranteeing the institution’s debt) and an
executed “Fee Letter” (pursuant to which the institution agreed to pay the fees associated
with the Guarantee Scheme as described below).
The Eligibility Certificate issued upon acceptance of an application notified potential
purchasers of the debt that HM Treasury would be responsible for any payments the debtissuing institution failed to make. The terms of this obligation were set forth in a “Deed of
Guarantee” made by HM Treasury in favor of all persons holding any debt guaranteed under
the Guarantee Scheme. Once the Eligibility Certificate had been issued, the financial
institution would have 30 days to issue the debt it covered.
Upon the earlier of the issuance of the debt or three business days after the issuance of the
Eligibility Certificate, the financial institution would become responsible for paying a fee
based on a per annum rate of 50 basis points (bps) plus 100% of the median five-year credit
default swap (CDS) spread during the 12 months ended July 1, 2008, of the debt-issuing
institution or any affiliate designated by HM Treasury. This fee would apply to the principal
amount specified in the Eligibility Certificate and would last until the scheduled maturity of
the debt (or for 30 days after the Eligibility Certificate was issued if no debt was ever issued).
The fee was payable in the currency set forth in the Eligibility Certificate and could be
increased to reflect any costs associated with payment in currencies other than sterling.
Participating institutions initially had to agree to specified limitations on balance sheet
growth tied to the average growth of the UK banking sector and the growth of the UK’s
economy. UK authorities later eliminated these restrictions. The Guarantee Scheme also
prohibited explicit use of the Scheme as part of an institution’s marketing. With the
prolongation of the Guarantee Scheme in April 2009, UK authorities introduced a
requirement that large banks issuing guaranteed debt after April 9, 2009 agree to negotiated
levels of lending to the real economy.
HM Treasury initially anticipated that £250 billion in debt would be issued under the
Guarantee Scheme, and it established this amount as the size of the program subject to
subsequent adjustment. HM Treasury determined the amount that individual institutions
could issue pursuant to the Guarantee Scheme based on their sterling deposit liabilities.
Eligible institutions had until the end of a specified issuance window (such end originally set
as April 9, 2009, but later extended until December 31, 2009, and then February 28, 2010)
to apply for Eligibility Certificates and make new issuances of guaranteed debt. Following
the expiration of the issuance window (known in the parlance of the Guarantee Scheme as
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the “drawdown window”), all guaranteed debt issued pursuant to an Eligibility Certificate
could be rolled over until April 13, 2012. After that date, up to £83 billion (one-third the £250
billion program size) in guaranteed debt could be rolled over until April 9, 2014.
The Guarantee Scheme originally prohibited institutions from repurchasing and retiring any
debt issued. A June 2011 amendment established a Credit Guarantee Scheme Buyback
Facility that enabled issuers to repurchase guaranteed debt prior to maturity subject to a
break fee of 15% of the Guarantee Scheme fee that otherwise would have been payable had
the guaranteed debt remained outstanding.
Outcomes
A small group of eligible institutions made significant use of the Guarantee Scheme in the
first three months after its introduction. By the end of 2008, approximately £100 billion of
debt had been issued pursuant to the program by 14 institutions (including Barclays Bank
and Lloyds TSB). An additional 47 eligible institutions (including HSBC Bank and Standard
Chartered Bank) did not issue any debt under the Guarantee Scheme. In March 2010, shortly
after the issuance window for the Guarantee Scheme closed, outstanding issuances stood at
£125 billion, down from a total of £134 billion outstanding as debt issued during the early
days of the program matured (HM Treasury 2010). This was half of the £250 billion amount
initially projected by HM Treasury.
As indicated in Figure 3, debt was issued under the Guarantee Scheme in several different
currencies. The overwhelming majority of this debt had a maturity of between one and three
years, with less than £2 billion being issued with a maturity less than 12 months.
Figure 3: Credit Guarantee Scheme Issuances by Currency (as of March 24, 2010)

Source: HM Treasury 2010, p. 2
As shown in Figure 4, under the Guarantee Scheme’s rollover provisions as much as £83
billion of guaranteed debt could have remained outstanding as late as the program’s April
2014 termination date. Participating institutions did not make use of this feature however,
and by October 26, 2012, HM Treasury terminated the Guarantee Scheme after the final
guarantee expired. Over the life of the program, HM Treasury collected fees totaling £4.3
billion and wasn’t required to make any guarantee payouts (National Audit Office 2013).
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Figure 4: Timeline of the Debt Guaranteed under the Credit Guarantee Scheme

Source: National Audit Office 2010, p. 26

II. Key Design Decisions
1. The British government introduced the Guarantee Scheme as part of a package
of stabilization measures announced on October 8, 2008, that included a
recapitalization fund and the extension of a special liquidity program.
Faced with the potential collapse of the financial system following the rescue of HBOS and
Bradford & Bingley, the British government announced a package of measures on October 8,
2008, intended to “to ensure the stability of the financial system and to protect ordinary
savers, depositors, businesses and borrowers” (HM Treasury 2008a). In addition to the
Credit Guarantee Scheme (the Guarantee Scheme), this package included the £50 billion
Bank Recapitalisation Fund (pursuant to which the government could inject capital into
eligible institutions in return for equity) and an expansion of the existing Special Liquidity
Scheme (pursuant to which banks could exchange high-quality mortgage-backed and other
securities for HM Treasury bills for up to three years) to £200 billion, up from the £50 billion
initially projected. The Bank of England declared debt guaranteed pursuant to the Guarantee
Scheme eligible for all of the Bank’s extended collateral operations including the Special
Liquidity Scheme.
2. The Guarantee Scheme was established pursuant to the authority of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer to issue guarantees of debt.
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This authority allowed for the establishment of the Guarantee Scheme without the need for
additional legislation.
3. In accordance with State aid rules, the Guarantee Scheme required European
Commission approval to be implemented.
UK authorities notified the European Commission of the October 8 package of measures on
October 11, 2008, and received approval on October 13, 2008, under a new accelerated
procedure for emergency rescue measures. The European Commission found the measures
to be “compatible with EU State aid rules, because they were an appropriate means to
remedy a serious disturbance in the UK economy” under Article 87(3)(b)of the European
Commission Treaty (EC 2008a). UK authorities subsequently notified the European
Commission of modifications to the Guarantee Scheme (including an expansion of eligible
currencies, a change to the formula for calculating fees, and an extension of the rollover
window) on December 18, 2008, and received approval on December 23, 2008.
4. The size of the program was initially established at £250 billion, subject to
subsequent adjustment.
The British government established the size of the Guarantee Scheme at £250 billion,
reflecting HM Treasury’s estimate of the amount of debt likely to be issued pursuant to the
program. This total was subject to subsequent adjustment; because actual issuance proved
to be far less than the £250 billion projection, no adjustment in total size was ever made.
5. Eight major UK financial institutions were automatically eligible for the
Guarantee Scheme, and other UK deposit takers and building societies could
apply for eligibility.
When the British government introduced the Guarantee Scheme as part of the October 8,
2008, package of stabilization measures, it made eight institutions, consisting of the major
UK banks and the largest building societies,4 automatically eligible for participation “in
recognition of their commitment to strengthen their aggregate capital position” by a
collective £25 billion in Tier 1 capital pursuant to the Bank Recapitalisation Fund that was
also part of the package. This commitment occurred following “discussions convened by HM
Treasury.” Other UK deposit takers (including UK-incorporated subsidiaries of foreign
institutions) and building societies could apply to be eligible, with eligibility contingent on a
determination by HM Treasury that the applicant possessed sufficient Tier 1 capital.
Applicants would also be evaluated on their roles in the UK banking system and overall
economy.

4

See footnote 3.
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6. Senior unsecured debt instruments with standard market terms used to
refinance liabilities maturing after the launch of the Guarantee Scheme were
eligible.
These instruments could take the form of a certificate of deposit, commercial paper, a bond,
or a note. No cross-default or cross-acceleration provisions could be included.
7. Debt with maturities of up to three years could be issued under the Guarantee
Scheme.
The government does not appear to have established minimum maturity requirements for
eligible debt.
8. Only debt issued in sterling, euros, or US dollars was eligible for the Guarantee
Scheme until the list of eligible currencies was expanded.
This initial list of eligible currencies was ultimately expanded as part of the December 2008
modifications to include Australian dollars, Canadian dollars, Swiss Francs, and Japanese
yen, with the objective of “further extending the investor base in UK banks and building
societies” (HM Treasury 2008b).
9. Individual caps on participation were to be determined by HM Treasury based
on a firm’s sterling deposit liabilities.
Program documents did not provide a specific rationale for using this measure to determine
individual participation caps.
10. The fee for issuing debt pursuant to the Guarantee Scheme varied based on the
soundness of the issuing bank.
HM Treasury charged a fee (payable in the currency in which the guarantee was
denominated) equal to a per annum rate of 50 bps plus 100% of the median five-year CDS
spread during the 12 months ended July 1, 2008, of the debt-issuing institution or any
affiliate designated by HM Treasury. This fee could be increased in HM Treasury’s discretion
to reflect any added cost associated with guaranteeing debt issued in currencies other than
sterling.
This approach to determining fees based on institution-specific risk as measured through
five-year CDS spreads was consistent with the fee framework subsequently set forth by the
European Central Bank in its “Recommendations on Government Guarantees on Bank Debt”
of October 20, 2008. UK authorities initially chose the 12-month period ended October 7,
2008 as the CDS reference period for the fee calculation, but in December 2008 they shifted
to the July 1, 2008 end date based on a desire to lower fees to be more consistent with other
countries’ guarantee programs. This revised reference period had retroactive effect.
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11. The repurchase of guaranteed debt was initially prohibited; it later became
subject to a cancellation fee.
When introduced, the Guarantee Scheme contained a provision prohibiting eligible debt
from including any right of prepayment by the issuer. On June 8, 2011, UK authorities
amended the Guarantee Scheme to include a Buyback Facility pursuant to which issuers
could repurchase and cancel guaranteed debt. Such repurchases would relieve the issuer of
the obligation to pay any future guarantee fees on the cancelled debt, in exchange for which
the issuer would pay a break fee equal to 15% of the total future guarantee fees avoided.
12. Participating institutions faced a prohibition on using the Guarantee Scheme in
advertising and, initially, limitations on growth. A requirement for lending to
the real economy was later added.
Institutions participating in the Guarantee Scheme initially had to limit their growth “to the
higher of the average historical growth of the balance sheets in the UK banking sector during
the period 1987–2007, or the annual rate of growth of UK nominal GDP in the preceding
year.” In December 2008, UK authorities eliminated this condition for institutions deemed
“fundamentally sound.”
Participants also had to refrain from “explicitly promoting [themselves] on the basis of the
state guarantee” (European Commission 2008b). These restrictions were consistent with
European Commission guidelines subsequently released in October 2008 on potential
safeguards “to minimize…distortions and the potential abuse of the preferential situations
of beneficiaries brought about by a State guarantee” and “to avoid moral hazard” (European
Commission 2008c).
A set of additional conditions including compensation restrictions, lending commitments,
and support for mortgage assistance programs imposed on participants in the Bank
Recapitalisation Fund did not generally apply to the Guarantee Scheme but could be imposed
on a case-by-case basis, particularly for institutions that made heavy use of it (European
Commission 2008b).
In connection with the prolongation of the Guarantee Scheme in April 2009, UK authorities
added a requirement that large banks (defined as having more than £25 billion in sterling
eligible liabilities) issuing guaranteed debt after April 9, 2009 commit to a negotiated level
of lending to the real economy.
13. Participating institutions had to submit a plan for ultimately being able to
access the wholesale funding market without the benefit of the Guarantee
Scheme.
UK authorities intended this requirement to help ensure that only those institutions that
would be viable absent crisis conditions could access the Guarantee Scheme.
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14. The deadline for issuance under the Guarantee Scheme was initially April 9,
2009, but was later extended to February 28, 2010.
According to UK authorities, lingering uncertainty about the credit risk of individual
financial institutions continued to hinder interbank lending markets as the Guarantee
Scheme approached its originally scheduled issuance deadline. This required that the
Guarantee Scheme be prolonged.
15. Even after the issuance deadline, guaranteed debt could be rolled over for a
certain period of time.
Following the expiration of the issuance window, all guaranteed debt issued pursuant to an
Eligibility Certificate could be rolled over until April 13, 2012. After that date, up to £83
billion (one-third the £250 billion program size) in guaranteed debt could be rolled over
until April 9, 2014. The purpose of these rollover provisions was “to enable participating
institutions to manage better the transition from guaranteed to wholly unsupported
funding” (House of Commons 2008).

III. Evaluation
Although the specific impact of the Guarantee Scheme is difficult to determine, given that it
was one component of a package of measures introduced at the same time (including a
significant expansion of the Special Liquidity Scheme and the creation of the Bank
Recapitalisation Fund), the establishment of the Guarantee Scheme was followed by a
significant reduction in the stress that had been roiling wholesale funding markets. As shown
in Figure 5, less than a month after the introduction of the Guarantee Scheme CDS spreads
for many leading UK financial institutions had fallen by a half to two-thirds.
Figure 5: Major UK Banks’ Credit Default Swap Spreads, April 2008–October 2008

Source: Bank of England 2008, p. 6
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announcing
changes
to
the
Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/pr151208.pdf.
Market Notice: Review of the Government’s 2008 Credit Guarantee Scheme (12/15/2008) –
Debt Management Office press release announcing changes to the Guarantee Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/mktnotice151208.pdf.
State Aid: Commission Approves Modifications to UK Financial Support Measures to the
Banking Industry (12/23/2008) – European Commission press release approving a change to
the
Guarantee
Scheme’s
fee
structure
and
currencies.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/State_aid__Commission_app
roves_modifications_to_UK_financial_support_measures_to_the_banking_industry.pdf.
State Aid: Commission Approves Prolongation of UK Financial Support Measures to Banking
Sector (04/15/2009) – European Commission press release approving the prolongation of the
Guarantee
Scheme
until
October
13,
2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/State_aid__Commission_app
roves_prolongation_of_UK_financial_support_measures_to_banking_sector.pdf.
Market Notice: Extension of the Drawdown Window (10/13/2009) – Debt Management
Office press release announcing an extension of the issuance window for the Guarantee Scheme
until
December
31,
2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/pr20091013.pdf.
Market Notice: Extension of the Drawdown Window (12/9/2009) – Debt Management Office
press release announcing an extension of the issuance window for the Guarantee Scheme until
February
28,
2010.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/pr20091209.pdf.
Market Notice: State Aid Approval for Extension and Rules Amendments (12/17/2009) –
Debt Management Office press release announcing European Commission approval of changes
to
the
Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/pr20091217.pdf.
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Reports/Assessments
Financial Stability Report Summary (Bank of England October 2008) – Bank of England
report on threats to financial stability, including those that gave rise to the Guarantee Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/fsrsum0810.pdf.
Maintaining Financial Stability Across the United Kingdom’s Banking System (National Audit
Office 12/04/2009) – National Audit Office report on the British government’s response to the
financial
crisis,
including
the
Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/091091.pdf.
Maintaining Financial Stability Across the United Kingdom’s Banking System – Twelfth
Report of Session 2009–10 (Committee of Public Accounts 02/09/2010) – House of Commons
report on the British government’s response to the financial crisis, including the Guarantee
Scheme. https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/190.pdf.
2008 Credit Guarantee Scheme (HM Treasury 03/29/2010) – HM Treasury report on the
operations
of
the
Guarantee
Scheme
during
the
issuance
window.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/pr20100419.pdf.
Maintaining the Financial Stability of UK Banks: Update on the Support Schemes (National
Audit Office 12/15/2010) – National Audit Office report on the British government’s response
to
the
financial
crisis,
including
the
Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/1011676.pdf.
The Financial Stability Interventions (National Audit Office 07/13/2011) – National Audit
Office report on the British government’s interventions during the financial crisis, including the
Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/HMT_account_2010_2011.p
df.
Financial Stability Report (Bank of England 12/01/2011) – Bank of England report on threats
to
financial
stability,
including
data
on
the
Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/fsrfull1112.pdf.
Review of HM Treasury’s Management Response to the Financial Crisis (HM Treasury March
2012) – HM Treasury report on its response to the financial crisis, including the Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Review%20of%20HM%20T
reasury's%20management%20response%20to%20the%20financial%20crisis.pdf.
The Comptroller and Auditor General’s Report to the House of Commons (National Audit
Office 07/12/2013) – National Audit Office report on the British government’s response to the
financial
crisis,
including
the
Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/HMT-Accounts-201213.pdf.
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